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A type of emergency decision-making which has not received research attention is the police search for a lost person
in a rural or wilderness area. For many such incidents, decisions concerning where to search for the lost subject are made
by a planning team, each member of which assigns probabilities to the various hypotheses about where the subject might
be located, including the residual hypothesis that the subject is somewhere else entirely, that is, outside of the designated
search area. In the current study, 32 adult males with search planning experience were asked to assign probabilities to a
fictional lost person incident. It was hypothesized, according to support theory (Tversky & Koehler, 1994), that subjects
who first considered the five possible scenarios accounting for how the subject could have left the search area—i.e.,
unpacked the residual hypothesis—would subsequently increase their probability estimate of the global hypothesis that
the missing subject was not in the designated search area, compared to those subjects who unpacked the focal hypothesis.
This hypothesis was confirmed. We also found considerable evidence for subadditivity, as most subjects estimated higher
summed probabilities for the individual scenarios accounting for the focal and residual hypotheses, respectively. The
potential negative consequences of such unpacking effects during a lost person incident were discussed, and possible
means of mitigating such effects were described.
Keywords: decision making, support theory, subadditivity, emergency management.
1 Introduction
The past two decades have seen a growing interest in
the manner in which emergency responders make deci-
sions in the field. For example, Klein (1993) and his
colleagues have studied the decision-making processes
of various types of emergency managers, such as fire
commanders, who are required to initiate an appropri-
ate response to their respective emergencies as early in
their incidents as possible. These researchers have found
that the emergency managers whom they studied rarely
consider alternative options simultaneously in an analytic
fashion. Rather, the manager’s decision making follows
the pattern termed “satisficing” (Simon, 1955), in which
the first satisfactory option that comes to mind is selected.
The expertise of emergency managers, according to Klein
(1993), is reflected in their ability to quickly categorize
an emergency according to their experience, and to imag-
ine a scenario in which a particular course of action to-
ward resolving the emergency could be successfully im-
plemented.
One type of emergency response not studied by Klein
and his associates is the police search for a person lost
in a large scale rural or wilderness area, a topic which
has only recently become a focus of research by behav-
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ioral scientists (Cornell & Hill, 2006; Heth & Cornell,
1998). A variety of people become the targets of such
searches, including hunters, hikers, anglers, and other
outdoor enthusiasts, as well as children who wander away
from camp or rural homes, and elderly people suffering
from senile dementia (see Koester, 2008, for additional
categories). Organized searches for lost people usually
come under the authority of public safety personnel such
as county sheriffs, regional or state police officers, con-
servation officers, or park rangers. In North America, the
search management system prescribed by the National
Association for Search and Rescue is nearly universally
recognized as the “best practice” model for organizing a
lost person incident (Hill, 1997), and is itself an appli-
cation of the Incident Command System endorsed by the
U. S. Federal Emergency Management Agency for man-
aging all emergency incidents (NIMS, 2008). Below, the
system will be described as it pertains to decision mak-
ing processes and other cognitive variables, particularly
subjective judgments of probability.
A lost person incident begins with a decision that the
subject of a missing person report may be spatially disori-
ented in a large rural environment, such as a forested area.
Such incidents are usually considered to be highly urgent,
as factors related to health, age, weather, or natural haz-
ards may threaten the subject’s safety. In most U.S. states
and Canadian provinces, the officer who is given author-
ity for the incident has at his or her disposal any num-
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ber of resources for assistance, including other officers,
personnel from other agencies, and civilian search and
rescue volunteers, including field searchers, search dog
handlers, and search coordinators. Even before searchers
arrive at the location where the search will be conducted,
a search management team will be appointed for the first
operational period (usually 12 hours). Upon arrival at
the scene, the incident commander—in consultation with
other members of the search management team—will set
in motion routinized efforts to quickly locate the missing
subject, such as tasking searchers or canine teams to track
the missing person from the “place last seen” (PLS). As
well, efforts to confine the subject to the search locale will
usually be implemented, such as setting up trail blocks
some distance away from the PLS. After these first steps
are initiated, however, the incident commander will con-
fer with the search management team in a concerted plan-
ning session, which is strikingly unlike the “satisficing”
process described by Klein. Environmental psychologists
Heth and Cornell (2006), who have studied the decision-
making processes of search managers, cogently described
a typical planning session:
Unlike most paramilitary operations, there is a surpris-
ing amount of consensual decision making. Experienced
search and rescue command teams believe that no one
person can authoritatively state the best course of action.
Like the naval navigation teams described by Hutchins
(1995), there are fixed responsibilities and social hier-
archies when operations are executed, but in contrast to
an authoritarian and decisive control, experienced search
managers seek consultation and develop their hypothe-
ses and plans modestly with one to four others. Dur-
ing these discussions, the search and rescue planning
team makes the search tractable by parsing the environ-
ment and developing scenarios of what likely happened to
the lost person. Thereafter, search management consists
largely of iterative task assignments in which individuals
or teams are dispatched to check these possibilities. The
methodology is Bayesian: the planning team will revise
its priorities on the basis of field reports from the search
teams, along with clues, eyewitness reports, and similar
evidence uncovered during search activities (Heth & Cor-
nell, 2006).
Specifically, the planning session involves identifying
a primary search area in which search activities will be
conducted, and then dividing this larger area into any
number of smaller segments to which single search re-
sources (e.g., dog teams or search crews) can be tasked.
Once the segments are identified and drawn on the plan-
ning map, an attempt is made to prioritize the segments
in order to ensure that those areas most likely to contain
the missing subject are searched relatively early in the
incident. Prioritization is accomplished by requiring the
search planners to assign estimates of probability to each
of the segments, termed “probability of area” (POA). As
well, the methodology involves assigning some nontrivial
probability to the “rest of the world” (ROW), that is, all
of the area outside of the designated search area, which
will likely not be searched during that operational pe-
riod (Bownds, Ebersole, Lovelock, & O’Connor, 1991).
The individual probability judgments are then combined
and averaged, yielding a planning POA that reflects the
consensual probabilities that the subject may be located
within each segment as well as the ROW. As mentioned
in the quote above, the methodology is Bayesian, in that
the initial subjective probabilities are recomputed accord-
ing to Bayes theorem as segments are searched and the
lost person is not located (see Appendix A). Because the
ROW, by definition, does not receive search assignments,
it will necessarily grow larger in POA as the search pro-
ceeds and negative information decreases POA in vari-
ous segments within the search area. Indeed, search coor-
dinators are advised to monitor the POA of the “rest of
the world”, particularly with respect to decisions about
expanding the search, which is accomplished by partial-
ing out new segments formerly outside of the designated
search area (Hill, 1997).
As noted by Heth and Cornell (2006), the process
of developing a search plan resembles the interlocking
cognitive efforts contributed by members of a naviga-
tion crew of a U.S. Navy ship as described by Hutchins
(1995) in his book, Cognition in the Wild. Hutchins ap-
plied the term “distributed cognition” to describe such
mutual and complementary efforts of individual special-
ists using a host of cognitive “artifacts” such as maps,
charts, electronic instruments, and computers. Similarly,
Fischhoff and Johnson (1997) used the term “distributed
decision-making” to refer specifically to command-and-
control type operations in which decisions are made by
two or more individuals. Although during search opera-
tions numerous artifacts may be employed, such as maps,
software, statistical data, and lost person behavior “pro-
files” (Hill, 1997; Koester, 2008 ), the emphasis in this
article will be on the subjective probabilities initially as-
signed to the search area and which become the starting
point for the subsequent Bayesian computations made as
the search proceeds.
As stated earlier, the methodology for prioritizing the
search area requires planners to make subjective esti-
mates of probability for each segment in the search area,
plus the ROW. It is assumed that such judgments are
based on the planners’ SAR experience and acquired ex-
pertise, plus reference to actuarial data tabulated from
previous lost person incidents, such as how far from the
PLS various types of lost people tend to travel before
being located (Koester, 2008). Unfortunately, much re-
search on decision processes would appear to cast doubt
on the ability of planners to make valid probability judg-
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ments, as the ability to render unbiased assessments of
probability for uncertain events has been challenged by
Tversky & Koehler’s (1994) support theory (see also Rot-
tenstreich & Tversky, 1997). Briefly, support theory
maintains that subjective probability judgments are based
not on the likelihood of events themselves, but on de-
scriptions of events. Thus, the same event may be seen
as more or less likely depending on the manner in which
it is described to those making the judgments. For exam-
ple, people estimate significantly higher chances of dy-
ing from heart disease, cancer, or other natural causes,
than simply from any natural cause (Tversky & Koehler,
1994). This unpacking effect is said to occur whenever
people are asked to consider the disjoint components of
an uncertain event (that is, various possibilities that can
cause the event) rather than merely the event itself. In
other words, the more explicitly an event is described,
the more likely it will be judged to occur. Various expla-
nations for unpacking have been proposed, including the
tendency for an explicit inclusion of specific causes of
an effect to increase confidence in that cause (Koehler,
1991), or to remind people of possibilities they might
have overlooked (Rottenstreich & Tversky, 1997).
A side effect of unpacking is subadditivity. Accord-
ing to Tversky and Koehler (1994), when people are
asked to make a global judgment, such as the probabil-
ity of dying from an unnatural cause, they tend to base
their judgments on a representative or typical case, with-
out necessarily delineating, in this example, the possible
types of unnatural causes. However, unpacking the event
to be judged (e.g., homicide, fatal accident, drowning)
not only leads to higher estimates of probability, but fre-
quently in total probabilities greater than 100% (Cahan,
Gilon, Manor, & Paltiel, 2003; Koehler, 2000; Tversky &
Koehler, 1994). The term subadditivity therefore refers
to the fact that probability judgments of the globally de-
scribed event are less than the sum of that assigned to the
unpacked version of the event.
Another important consideration in support theory per-
tains to those occasions when people judge the relative
probabilities of two or more mutually exclusive hypothe-
ses. For example, if there are three suspects in a crime, A,
B, and C, the hypothesis that A is the culprit (and the as-
sociated probability that A did it) is termed the focal hy-
pothesis, while the possibility that someone other than A
is guilty (B, C, or some unknown X) is called the residual
hypothesis. In this case, the set of possibilities—either
A or not-A (symbolized as Ā)—is discrete (that is, ei-
ther hypothesis must necessarily be true). In support the-
ory, each hypothesis under consideration will have vary-
ing degrees of support, each depending on the manner in
which the hypothesis is described (for example, whether
or not it is unpacked). When comparing the relative prob-
abilities of the focal and residual hypotheses, support for
the former (s[A]) will decrease the estimated probability
for the latter (s[Ā]), as seen in the formula:
P (A, Ā) =
s(A)
s(A) + s(Ā)
where P (A, Ā) refers to the probability that A rather than
Ā is true.
Bringing the discussion back to the search and rescue
planning task, we can describe the hypothesis that the
missing subject is in the designated search area as the
focal hypothesis, while the possibility that he or she is
somewhere else—the ROW—as the residual hypothesis.
A typical application of the POA methodology described
earlier, using the support theory terminology, is as such.
After some discussion, the individual planners proceed to
individually unpack the search area into smaller segments
(all of which represent separate hypotheses about where
the subject might be), and finally to allocate some prob-
ability to the residual hypothesis, that is, that the person
is in none of those segments. At this point, we can begin
to form our own hypotheses as to why this methodology
sometimes fails.
According to Hill (1997), the single most common rea-
son why a lost person is not found in a reasonable period
of time is that the victim had traveled out of the desig-
nated search area and that search planners had not ex-
tended the search into the ROW soon enough. A simi-
lar problem is apparently encountered by the U.S. Coast
Guard in their conduct of maritime SAR, such as search-
ing for missing vessels at sea. Described as “scenario
lock,” it is said to occur “when planners become fixated
on a particular. . . scenario to the exclusion of all others”
(Frost, 1999). It is possible, if not indeed likely, that
planners in these emergency situations are experiencing
unpacking effects which tend to keep them unreasonably
“locked” to their focal hypotheses. In other words, in
considering all the many possibilities that could account
for the missing person (or vessel at sea) to be in any of
the search segments, planners estimate a consensus POA
that is inflated for the focal hypothesis (that the target
is in the designated search area) while underestimated
for the residual hypothesis (that the target is somewhere
else). Even if a Bayesian procedure is used for reevalu-
ating POA as the search proceeds, the eventual decision
to reject the focal hypothesis and to start extending the
search into the ROW is delayed, to the detriment of the
lost person’s safety. For example, in the application of the
Bayesian formula as applied to SAR (see Appendix A),
POA’s are updated each time a segment is searched and
the subject is not found. With each iteration, the POA of
the ROW grows slightly larger. However, when the initial
POA of the “rest of the world” (the residual hypothesis)
is unrealistically low, it will take considerably longer for
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the Bayesian updating to raise its POA to a non-trivial
level, thereby delaying the extension of the search.
1.1 The current research
In this study we asked inland search planners to consider
a fictional lost person incident in which a deer hunter ap-
parently became lost in the woods while hunting. Sub-
jects made initial estimates of POA to the (packed) des-
ignated search area as well as the (packed) ROW. Subse-
quently, half of the subjects unpacked the segments con-
tained within the search area, while the remaining half
unpacked scenarios which would result in the lost person
having left the search area and entering the ROW. They
subsequently made new estimates of POA to the search
area and ROW. As such, the study was unlike previous
studies in support theory, in that subjects made before and
after probability judgments, rather than merely providing
one omnibus judgment after being asked to unpack the
focal hypothesis.
We hypothesized simply that subjects who unpacked
the hypothesis that the lost subject was not in the des-
ignated search area (the residual hypothesis) would sig-
nificantly increase their POA to the ROW, compared to
subjects who unpacked the conventional hypothesis: that
he was indeed somewhere inside the search area. We
also expected that unpacking would lead to subadditivity
in probability judgments, with cumulative POA totaling
more than global (packed) judgments.
2 Method
2.1 Subjects
Subjects were 32 adult males recruited at a state search
and rescue conference, attended by members of volun-
teer SAR teams, government emergency measures man-
agers, and military search and rescue personnel. Ages
ranged from 33 to 61, with a mean age of 39.4 years.
Overall, subjects had been involved in SAR for a mean
of 13.5 years and had participated in 75.8 SAR incidents.
All subjects had previously completed formal training in
search planning, as described earlier, including the as-
signment of subjective probabilities to segments in the
search area and ROW. As a group, they had participated
in a mean of 25.8 search incidents in the capacity of plan-
ner, although such experience varied considerably, with a
range of 1 to 200 lost person incidents.
2.2 Procedure
Subjects were interviewed individually at the experi-
menters’ booth in the exhibitors area of the conference
center. The study was introduced as a “map problem” in
which the participant’s opinions about the fictional lost
person’s whereabouts were of interest. Subjects were as-
sured that the incident was fictional and that there were
therefore no correct answers as to where the “lost person”
was actually located.
Subjects were shown a 1:50,000 topographical map of
a fairly level, forested wilderness area with many streams
and lakes (Appendix B). They were told that the target
of the search was a 27-year-old deer hunter who was re-
ported missing by his hunting partner. An X was posi-
tioned near the center of the map to designate the place
where he had last been seen. A 29 square kilometer “pri-
mary search area” was indicated on the map by a solid
line drawn with a colored marking pen. The search area
was almost entirely determined by the edges of streams,
lakes, and other watercourses. The participant’s attention
was drawn to the fact that there was a limited number of
routes by which the missing hunter could have exited the
search area without attempting the nearly impossible task
of crossing water.
Half of the subjects had been randomly assigned to
a focal hypothesis group, while the remaining half con-
sisted of the residual hypothesis group. The (second)
map presented to subjects in the focal hypothesis group
showed the primary search area now sectioned into five
segments. The (second) map shown to subjects in the
residual hypothesis (or ROW) group did not contain seg-
ments, but now had five lettered locations where it was
possible for the lost person to have left the search area
and entered the “rest of the world”. The locations were
identified and described for the participant. The two maps
were otherwise identical (see Appendix B for the scripts
used in the procedure).
Before proceeding to unpack either the focal or resid-
ual hypotheses, all subjects first made general assign-
ments of probability of area to both the (packed) primary
search area and the ROW. In order to control for order ef-
fects, half of each group first assigned POA to the search
area and then the ROW, while the remaining half assigned
POA in the reverse order. After these initial probabili-
ties were recorded, subjects in the focal hypothesis group
then proceeded to assign POA to each of the five seg-
ments, while subjects in the residual hypothesis group as-
signed probabilities to each of the five possible scenarios
by which the missing hunter could have left the primary
search area.1
Following the assignment of POA to either the search
area or the ROW, subjects repeated their assignments of
1We recognize the fact that these probabilities do not pertain to
equivalent events: subjects in the focal hypothesis group were asked to
estimate the subject’s geographic location, while subjects in the residual
hypothesis group made judgments based on possible behavioral scenar-
ios. We reasoned that the expected unpacking effects should not be
affected by these differences.
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probability of area to both the focal and residual hypothe-
ses.
3 Results
We defined an unpacking effect as referring to those oc-
casions when a participant increased their assignments of
probability to their respective hypotheses (focal or resid-
ual, depending on their experimental condition) after un-
packing that hypothesis. We defined subadditivity as the
assignment of summed, unpacked POA that was higher
than their initial probability judgment for the focal or
residual hypothesis, respectively. For example, if a par-
ticipant initially assigned 75% POA to the search area
(the focal hypothesis), then proceeded to assign a total
of 90% POA to the five segments contained within the
search area, then he or she has demonstrated subaddi-
tivity. Generally, we found significant evidence of both
unpacking and subadditivity.
3.1 Unpacking effects
Overall, before the unpacking manipulation, subjects as-
signed a mean of .80 (SD = .16) to the designated search
area, and .17 (SD = .12) to the “rest of the world”. Af-
ter unpacking either the search area or the ROW, overall
mean probabilities remained virtually unchanged, with a
mean of .81 (SD = .14) to the search area and .18 (SD =
.13) to the ROW. However, as predicted, an analysis of
change scores revealed that subjects who unpacked the
residual (ROW) hypothesis, compared to those who un-
packed the focal hypothesis, significantly increased their
probability estimates that the lost person had left the
search area, F (1,28) = 4.753, p = .038, η2p = .145. As
a group, subjects who unpacked the residual hypothesis
subsequently increased their probability estimates to the
“rest of the world” by over 4%, while those who had
unpacked the focal hypothesis actually decreased their
POA estimates to the ROW by nearly 3%, suggesting
that their judged likelihood that the lost person was in the
targeted search area had been enhanced (see Table 1).
It should be noted, however, that unpacking effects
were shown by only 11 of the 32 subjects, or 34% of the
sample. This observation raised the question regarding
the source of the significant unpacking effect. Although
we cannot answer this question fully, we can largely rule
out the possibility that highly experienced subjects are
less likely to show the effect. We performed a median
split, dividing planners with high experience (15 or more
incidents in the role of planner, M = 48.25) from those
with relatively low experience (10 or fewer incidents,
M = 3.4). We found that highly experienced planners
were if anything more likely than low-experienced plan-
ners to show unpacking effects. Specifically, 8 of the
16 highly experienced planners demonstrated unpacking,
while only 3 of the 16 low-experienced planners showed
unpacking. Moreover, 5 of the 8 highly experienced plan-
ners who demonstrated unpacking effects were in the
residual hypothesis condition (“the subject is not in the
designated search area”). These results indicate therefore
that the tendency to increase probability judgments to the
residual hypothesis, after unpacking its components, was
demonstrated mostly by the highly experienced search
planners, although the difference was not statistically sig-
nificant.2
3.2 Subadditivity
Twenty-five of the 32 subjects (78%) demonstrated sub-
additivity, that is, proceeded to assign more total proba-
bility to the individual segments (focal hypothesis group)
or ROW scenarios (residual hypothesis group) than they
had initially assigned to the search area or ROW, re-
spectively, before the unpacking manipulation. Gener-
ally, subadditivity was demonstrated by both the focal
hypothesis and residual hypothesis groups. Subjects who
unpacked the focal hypothesis attributed higher summed
probabilities to the five segments, M = 1.07 (SD = .33),
than they had originally assigned to the search area, M =
.82 (SD = .14). This difference was statistically signifi-
cant, t(15) = 3.14, p = .007. Similarly, subjects who un-
packed the residual hypothesis—that the subject had en-
tered the ROW—assigned higher summed probabilities to
the five scenarios accounting for his having left the search
area, M = .72 (SD = .58), compared to their original esti-
mated probabilities, M = .19 (SD = .13). This difference
was also statistically significant, t(15) = 3.72, p = .002.
Although the increase in POA for the residual hypothe-
sis group (M = .52, SD = .58) seemed considerably higher
than that of the focal hypothesis group (M = .25, SD =
.32), the difference was not statistically significant, t(30)
= 1.61, p = .118. Also, the subadditivity scores of highly
experienced planners (M = 0.42, SD = 0.59) were not sig-
nificantly higher than those of the low-experienced group
(M = 0.36, SD = 0.43), t(30) = 0.346, p = .732.
4 Discussion
The planning process exhibited by a search management
team could be described as what Hutchins (1995) terms
“socially distributed cognition” from which an emergent
decision is intended to be superior to any of the solutions
proposed by individual planners. For such a process to
work, suggests Hutchins, there should be a “diversity of
2Additional statistical tests using various continuous measures of ex-
perience were in the same direction and likewise not significant.
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Table 1: Pre- and post-test mean probability judgments of Focal- and Residual-hypothesis groups (SD’s in parenthesis).
Group Search area 1 Search area 2 ROW 1 ROW 2
Focal .81 (.14) .85 (.13) .16 (.13) .14 (.10)
Residual .78 (.17) .78 (.14) .19 (.17) .22 (.14)
Note: Headings with “1” indicates pre-test, while “2” indicates post-test (after unpacking).
interpretations” of the available evidence, with specific
limitations placed upon the degree to which individuals
can be allowed to persuade others to adopt a particu-
lar interpretation. “By averaging the POA of several or
more people with varying types of experience and points
of view”, wrote Hill (1997), “the consensus method [of
search planning] will tend to counter the influences of in-
dividual biases and tendencies to underestimate or over-
estimate probabilities” (p. 115).
Unfortunately, as the results of the current study in-
dicate, the consensus method of developing a search plan
does not appear to adequately address one particular bias,
the unpacking effect (Tversky & Koehler, 1994), that is,
the tendency to increase the subjective probability of an
hypothesis after considering the evidence that supports it.
Of particular note is the finding that 50% of the search
planners who considered five scenarios supporting the
residual hypothesis—that the missing subject was not in
the designated search area—subsequently assigned sig-
nificantly higher probabilities to the “rest of the world”,
compared to their first assessment. Conversely, 27% of
those subjects who unpacked the five components of the
focal hypothesis proceeded to show increased confidence
in their initial assessments. This latter finding would
seem to contribute to the “scenario lock” described by
Frost (1999), and the failure to extend the designated
search area at an appropriate time (Hill, 1997).
Although the experiment had not been designed to as-
sess the role of expertise in search planning, we did find
that the most experienced planners in the sample (aver-
aging 48 SAR incidents in the role of planner) were if
anything more likely than were less experienced plan-
ners to show unpacking effects, especially in the residual-
hypothesis condition. This tentative finding was unex-
pected and raises interesting questions about the possible
effect that expertise might have in the reassessment of
a global hypothesis after unpacking its components. The
fact that five of the eight highly experienced planners who
unpacked the residual hypothesis (“the subject is outside
the search area”) subsequently changed their minds and
increased their probability estimates to “the rest of the
world”, is difficult to interpret without a measure of cor-
respondence, i.e., the degree to which this reconsidera-
tion may or may not lead to improved probability judg-
ments.
On the other hand, highly experienced planners were
no more likely than those with less experience to show
subadditivity in their probability estimates. Most sub-
jects (78%) in this experiment demonstrated subadditiv-
ity, that is, proceeded to assign higher summed proba-
bilities to the five scenarios than they had initially made
to the packed, global hypothesis. Indeed, in some cases,
summed probabilities exceeded 100%, thereby replicat-
ing previous studies of support theory (Cahan et al, 2003;
Koehler, 2000; Tversky & Koehler, 1994). For exam-
ple, Cahan et al, 2003, found that 65% of the physicians
in their study demonstrated subadditivity when estimat-
ing the various causes of chest pain in a hypothetical pa-
tient. Similarly, Redelmeier, Koehler, Liberman, & Tver-
sky (1995) found that their sample of physicians, asked to
estimate the probabilities of various prognoses for a hy-
pothetical patient with heart disease, provided summed
probabilities averaging 164%.
As stated earlier, subadditivity appears to result from
unpacking a global hypothesis, with the subjective prob-
ability of each component hypothesis growing as the ev-
idence is considered. Although algorithms which correct
for subadditivity are included in search management soft-
ware such as CASIE III (Bownds et al, 1991; see also
Bownds et al, 1994 for a discussion of the method for cor-
recting subadditivity), such software cannot correct the
unpacking effect itself, that is, the tendency to inflate the
initial probabilities as a result of unpacking a global hy-
pothesis.
We have stated that overconfidence in the focal
hypothesis—that the missing person is somewhere in
the designated search area—may lead to a kind of sce-
nario lock, resulting in inflated subjective probabilities
that may delay the expansion of the search area into the
“rest of the world,” even when the Bayesian method-
ology for updating probabilities is applied. We might
propose as a solution for such overconfidence that the
method of assigning POA be altered such that planners
first unpack the residual hypothesis rather than the fo-
cal one. That is, after defining a designated search area,
in which the subject is believed to be located, the plan-
ners could then proceed to consider the possibility that
their focal hypothesis is incorrect, and to look for evi-
dence which could in fact disprove it. After unpacking
the ROW, planners could then proceed to assign probabil-
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ities to the segments within the search area, in the usual
manner. As demonstrated in the present study by sub-
jects in the residual hypothesis condition, this may likely
lead to more realistic probabilities assigned to compo-
nents of the focal hypothesis. As described, this “what
if I’m wrong?” approach to decision making is similar to
the so-called “crystal ball” technique and the “prospec-
tive hindsight” approach found by various researchers to
significantly decrease overconfidence in a focal hypoth-
esis (e.g., Mitchell, Russo, & Pennington, 1989; Koriat,
Lichtenstein, & Fischoff, 1980; Veinott, Klein, & Wig-
gins, 2010).
On the other hand, it is possible that such a radi-
cal change in procedure could conceivably lead in some
cases to underconfidence in the focal hypothesis (Griffin
& Tversky, 2002), causing planners to assign probabili-
ties to the designated search area that are too low. This
could lead to an equally decremental impact on the over-
all search plan, causing the searchers to abandon the orig-
inal search area much too soon. Indeed, victims are often
missed by the first and even second search resource to
pass their way (Hill, 1997), and some victims, such as
small children and adults suffering from senile dementia,
often require a nearly exhaustive search of their locale be-
fore they can be found (Koester, 2008). One possible so-
lution might simply be a compromise, that is, to balance
the planning process such that half the planners unpack
the search area in the conventional manner, while the re-
maining half proceed to unpack various scenarios which
could account for the subject having entered the “rest of
the world”. However, further research on probability es-
timates by search planners should be conducted before
such recommendations can be made, including, we sug-
gest, studies of the “calibration” or relative accuracy of
their judgments (Koehler, Brenner, & Griffin, 2002).
We conclude this discussion by returning to the topic
of emergency management, as raised earlier. For the most
part, research on emergency decision making has been
dominated by the work of Klein and his colleagues (e.g.,
Klein, 1993, 1998, 2008). His “Natural Decision Mak-
ing” (NDP) approach, which emphasizes the expertise of
a single decision maker, such as a fire commander, does
not seem to apply very well to the planning stage of a
SAR incident, in which a group of planners by necessity
must prioritize various options. Indeed, he has been crit-
ical of what he terms the “heuristics and bias” approach
of Kahneman and Tversky, arguing that such biases are
“reduced or eliminated if we study people with expertise
working in natural settings” (Klein, 1998). To the ex-
tent that the search planners in the current study could be
described as having some degree of expertise, and that
the map problem resembles those which they encounter
in actual incidents, we propose that our findings demon-
strate that emergency managers can indeed make deci-
sions that are something less than rational, perhaps rou-
tinely. This is not to say that Klein’s NDP approach does
not apply to SAR. It is very likely that many of the ini-
tial actions of first-responding search coordinators arriv-
ing on the scene may well adhere to NDP, as they make
urgent decisions regarding which trails to search or where
to set up confinement (Hill, 1997). We are suggesting
rather that when these same search managers meet with
other planners, sometime after the initial response, and
begin assigning probabilities to various scenarios, that
a different decision-making model applies, one which is
described by the tenets of support theory.
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Appendix A: Bayes Theorem for
shifting POA
Step 1: Find the new POA of a particular segment (X)
that has just been searched.
POAnew X =
(1− POD X)× POAold X
1− [(POD X)× POAold X]
Step 2: Find the new POA for each remaining (not-X)




1− [(POD X)× POAold X]
Notes on terminology:
POAnew: the new or “shifted” POA after segment X is
searched.
POAold: the old POA for the segment, prior to seg-
ment X being searched.
POD X: the probability of detection by which seg-
ment X was searched. (Probability of detection is a mea-
sure of the thoroughness of the search, or the likelihood
of finding the lost person if he or she had actually been in
the area being searched.)
(Source: Hill, 1997)
Appendix B: The map problem
Initial POA judgments
All subjects were initially shown a map containing only
the defined search area and the two trails, without seg-
ment boundaries or ROW scenarios. They were told,
This is a 1:50,000 topo map of a wooded
area of Nova Scotia. As you can see, it’s mostly
level terrain with some low hills, and lots of
ground water. In this scenario, a 27-year-old
deer hunter is reported missing by his hunting
partner. The subject is fairly well prepared for
the weather and is dressed in hunter orange.
It’s October. The temperature is 5 degrees Cel-
sius and there has been some recent rain. The
ground is still damp and the streams are high
and difficult to cross. The hunters parked their
car on the highway at the western head of the
trail [indicate on map]. They walked east on the
trail for several kilometers, then decided to split
up—the subject heading north and the partner
going south. Here’s the point where the partner
last saw the subject [indicate X on map]. They
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Figure 1: Grey-scale compilation of the three maps used in the study (original maps were in color). The thick outer
border defines the primary search area. The cross-hatched, horizontal line starting at “E” and passing through “C”, is
a major trail bisecting the area. A second trail extends vertically from the first trail and passes through “A”. The two
narrow (vertical) lines are streams serving as segment boundaries. The dotted lines are artificial boundaries emplaced
by search teams using colored forestry tape. The X in the center of the map represents the position where the missing
hunter was last seen.
split up at 4 p.m., and the plan was to hunt for
another hour, then meet on the trail at the point
where they separated. An hour later, the partner
returned to the trail but did not find his friend
there. After waiting until darkness—about 6
p.m.—the partner walked out to the highway
and called the Royal Canadian Mounted Po-
lice. The RCMP were told that the subject had
a compass, but no flashlight. The subject had
limited woods experience.
The searchers arrived at about 7 p.m. This
is the way the search managers on the scene
defined the primary search area. Notice that
most of the boundary is defined by streams,
rivers, and lakes, although it was necessary to
put down an artificial perimeter on the south
with flagging tape [indicate on map], as well
as one in the northeast between two lakes [in-
dicate on map], and a trail that travels east out
of the area [indicate]. So you see there are still
some places where the subject could have left
the area and entered the “rest of the world”.
What I’d like you to do is to image that you
are one of the search planners for this incident,
setting search priorities by assigning probabil-
ities. So let’s begin. Consider a scale of 0 to
100, with 100 meaning a perfect probability,
and 0 being no possibility. What do you think is
the chance that the subject is inside/outside the
primary search area at that time? What, then, is
the chance that the subject is inside/outside the
primary search area?
Half of the participants first made “inside” estimates,
while the remaining half first made “outside” judgments.
Focal hypothesis condition
After making initial POA judgments to both the primary
search area and ROW, subjects who made POA judg-
ments to the focal hypothesis (the lost person is inside
the search area) were shown a second map with the search
area divided into 5 segments (numbered 1 to 5). No in-
formation about the residual hypothesis scenarios (letters
A to E) was included. They were told,
This is how the area was divided into five
segments. I’ll describe each of the segments
and ask you to estimate the probability the
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subject would be found within each segment.
Again, please use a scale of 0 to 100, with 100
meaning a perfect probability.
Segment 1.
Let’s consider the possibility that the sub-
ject is located somewhere in Segment 1. As
you can see, this segment is defined by the wa-
tercourse in the west and north, a stream on
the east, and the trail to the south [indicate on
map]. Have a look at the map and tell me what
you think is the probability that the subject is in
Segment 1.
Segment 2.
Now, let’s consider the possibility that the
subject is located somewhere in segment 2.
This segment is defined by the watercourse in
the north, a stream on the west, a trail to the
east, and the trail to the south [indicate on map].
Have a look at the map and tell me what you
think is the probability that the subject is in
Segment 2.
Segment 3.
Now, let’s consider the possibility that the
subject is located somewhere in Segment 3.
This segment is defined by the watercourse in
the north and east, a trail on the west, and the
trail to the south [indicate on map]. Have a look
at the map and tell me what you think is the
probability that the subject is in Segment C.
Segment 4.
Now’s, let’s consider the possibility that
the subject is located somewhere in Segment
4. This segment is defined by the trail to the
north, a highway and watercourse on the west,
a stream on the east, and the flag line on the
south [indicate on map]. Have a look at the
map and tell me what you think is the proba-
bility that the subject is in Segment 4.
Segment 5.
Now, let’s consider the possibility that the
subject is located somewhere in Segment 5.
This segment is defined by the trail to the north,
a stream on the west, and watercourses on the
east and south [indicate on map]. Have a look
at the map and tell me what you think is the
probability that the subject is in Segment 5.
Residual hypothesis condition
After making initial POA judgments to both the primary
search area and ROW, subjects in the residual hypothesis
condition (the subject is in the ‘rest of the world’) were
shown a second map that contained the 5 ROW scenarios
(lettered A to E), without segmentation of the search area.
They were told,
Although the search planners had defined
the primary search area, there is always the pos-
sibility that the subject could have wandered
out of the search area and into the ‘rest of the
world’. They identified five different ways that
this could have happened. I’ll describe those
ways and ask you to estimate the probability of
each. Again, please use a scale of 0 to 100, with
100 meaning a perfect probability.
Scenario A.
Let’s consider the possibility that the sub-
ject left the search area through Location A .
As you can see, this trail [indicate on map] ex-
tends to the north, crosses a stream, and exits
the search area. Have a look at the map and tell
me what you think is the probability that the
subject left the search area near Location A.
Scenario B.
Now, let’s consider the possibility that the
subject left the search area through Location B.
As you can see [indicate on map], Location B
is an unconfining area to the northeast, where
the search area boundary is marked only with
forestry tape. Have a look at the map and tell
me what you think is the probability that the
subject left the search area near Location B.
Scenario C.
Now, let’s consider the possibility that the
subject left the search area through Location C.
As you can see, this trail [indicate on map] ex-
tends to the east, crosses a stream, and exits the
search area. Have a look at the map and tell me
what you think is the probability that the sub-
ject left the search area near Location C.
Scenario D.
Now, let’s consider the possibility that the
subject left the search area through Location D.
As you can see [indicate on map], Location D is
a wide area to the south, where the search area
boundary is marked only with forestry tape.
Have a look at the map and tell me what you
think is the probability that the subject left the
search area near Location D.
Scenario E.
Now, let’s consider the possibility that the
subject left the search area through some other
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route, such as walking back out to the trail-
head near Location E and leaving the area, or
any other exit that the search planners had not
identified. Have a look at the map and tell me
what you think is the probability that the sub-
ject left the search area either through Location
E or perhaps some other, unidentified location.
Post-condition POA judgments
After making their respective POA estimates for either
the focal or residual hypotheses, all subjects were again
shown the initial, unsegmented map with only the search
area and major trails indicated. They were told,
Now that you’ve had a chance to think more
about the situation, I’d like you to take another
look at the overall probabilities I asked you
about the first time. What do you think is the
chance that the subject is inside/outside the pri-
mary search area? What, then, is the chance
that the subject is inside/outside the primary
search area?
Half of the participants first made “inside” estimates,
while the remaining half first made “outside” judgments.
